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 The Mystery of Monogamy




This paper examines why developed countries are monogamous while rich men
throughout history have tended to practice polygyny (multiple wives). Wealth in-
equality naturally produces multiple wives for rich men in a standard model of the
marriage market. This paper argues that the sources of inequality, not just the level
of inequality, determine the equilibrium degree of monogamy or polygyny. In par-
ticular, when inequality is determined more by disparities in human capital versus
non-labor income (such as land, capital, corruption), the outcome is more monog-
amous. This explains why developed countries, where human capital is the main
source of income and inequality, are monogamous while less-developed economies
tend to be polygynous. The results are driven by the larger inequality in the value
of women in the marriage market in modern economies. When the value of human
capital increases, rich men increasingly value quality women who can help them raise
q u a l i t yc h i l d r e nm o r ee ﬃciently. As a result, high quality women are valued much
more than low quality women, which makes polygyny less aﬀordable for rich men.
In this manner, we show that male inequality generates polygyny, but female in-
equality reduces it. Using data from Cote d’Ivoire, we provide evidence for all the
main implications of the model. In particular, we control for a man’s total income
and show that polygyny increases with non-labor income but decreases with labor
income and education. These patterns are strong even within social groups where
norms regarding polygyny are likely to be constant.
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01 Introduction
Throughout history, wealthy men have tended to mate with multiple wives. This practice,
known as polygyny, exists in 850 of the 1170 societies recorded in Murdock’s Ethnographic
Atlas (Hartung (1982)). Polygyny is still prevalent in much of Africa where the percent of
women living in polygynous households ranges from 25% to 55% in the Western, Central,
and Eastern parts (Lesthaege (1986)). Moreover, polygyny is very easy to explain theo-
retically — male inequality in wealth tends to generate inequality in the number of their
wives (Becker (1991)). If all men were equal, there would be no reason for a woman to
b e c o m et h es e c o n dw i f eo fam a nw h e ns h ec a nj u s ta se a s i l yb et h eo n l yw i f eo fs o m e o n e
just as good. However, it is not well understood why polygyny is virtually non-existent
in modern industrialized societies, or in other words, why polygyny is so strongly associ-
ated with primitive economies both today and throughout history. Given the large and
often staggering disparities in wealth in many highly developed countries, it is somewhat
of a mystery that monogamy has emerged almost universally in the marriage market of
advanced economies.
Therefore, the primary goal of this paper is to oﬀer an explanation for the emergence
of monogamy as an equilibrium outcome even in the presence of persistently high levels
of income inequality. Our model demonstrates that a key factor explaining the practice
of monogamy versus polygyny is not just the level of inequality, but also the composition
of inequality. In particular, income is derived from labor income, which is a function
of human capital, and non-labor income such as land, physical capital, corruption, etc.
The model shows that the marriage market equilibrium becomes more monogamous as the
level of inequality is determined more by disparities in human capital versus disparities
in non-labor income. This result is consistent with the idea that inequality in advanced
economies is determined more by diﬀerences in human capital, while inequality in less-
developed societies is primarily due to a skewed distribution of non-labor income.1
A key assumption of the model is that high quality men and women are more eﬃcient
in producing higher quality children, which generates a comparative advantage for high
quality parents in raising higher quality children. Therefore, the rich men in less-developed
1For example, labor income explains 72% of the variation in total income for male heads of households
in the United States 1990 Census versus only 54% in Cote d’Ivoire in 1986 (see the empirical section for
a description of the Cote d’Ivoire data). Using log income and log wages, these numbers are 18% for the
US and 6% for Cote d’Ivoire. Also, this notion is consistent with the empirical growth literature which
shows that the negative eﬀect of land inequality on growth is usually found to be stronger than income
inequality. See Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Deininger and Squire (1998).
1economies, who typically have high non-labor income and low human capital, do not
produce quality children eﬃciently. As a result, rich men in less-developed economies
have a low demand for quality children, which translates into a low demand for quality
in women, since quality in women is valued only for its advantage in producing quality
c h i l d r e n . H e n c e ,t h ev a l u eo fw o m e ni nt h em a r r i a g em a r k e ti sd e t e r m i n e db yt h eq u a n t i t y ,
rather than the quality of children that women can produce. Assuming that all women
produce a similar expected number of children, all women are close substitutes for each
other in the marriage market in primitive economies, which keeps the price low enough
so that rich men can aﬀord more than one wife. Consequently, rich men in primitive
economies marry multiple wives and have many children with low levels of human capital.
In more advanced economies, human capital plays a larger role in determining the
level of income and inequality. Therefore, the wealthy men are typically men of higher
q u a l i t y ,n o tj u s tt h o s ew i t hm o re non-labor income. As a result, wealthy men have a higher
demand for child quality versus quantity because their cost of producing child quality is low
relative to the return. The increased demand for quality children increases the demand
for quality in women in the marriage market, since high quality men and women are
complements in the production of quality children. Thus, women are valued according to
both the quality and quantity of children they can produce, and therefore, high quality
women are a scarce resource in the marriage market in advanced economies. As a result,
women of diﬀerent quality levels are not highly substitutable for each other, and the high
value of quality women increases their price in the marriage market and makes polygyny
less aﬀordable for rich men who want high quality wives. Monogamy emerges in advance
economies because of the increasing value of high quality women in the marriage market,
which stems from the increasing value of their input in the production of child quality.2
In other words, male inequality generates polygyny, but female inequality reduces it.
The model shows that inequality in the value of women is necessary to reduce the degree
of polygynous mating — there needs to be a reason why rich men are willing to pay more
for less quantity. The model also shows how female inequality is generated. The value
of women in the marriage market is shown to be directly linked to the importance of her
children’s human capital. Therefore, when human capital is a bigger factor in determining
2Theoretically, the switch towards quality versus quantity in advanced economies, as in Becker, Murphy
and Tamura (1990), could increase the demand for polygyny if a rich man tries to increase quality by
decreasing the number of children per wife, and therefore, may lead to an oﬀsetting increase in the number
of wives. This equilibrium does not occur in our model since the comparative advantage of quality women
in producing quality children drives up the price of quality women to the point of making polygyny less
aﬀordable.
2her child’s future income, women who can create high quality children more eﬃciently are
increasingly valued in comparison to low quality women. This inequality within women
directly inﬂuences the degree of polygynous matching in equilibrium. As a result, male
inequality in less-developed societies translates into inequality in the number of wives per
man, while inequality in developed countries generates inequality in the quality of wives.
Becker (1991) calls inequality in the quality of wives “implicit polygyny,” which our model
shows is the equilibrium outcome when the source of inequality stems mainly from human
capital because of the inequality in the value of women in the marriage market.
The model also oﬀers an explanation of why and how the “power of women” is higher
in advanced societies. The increasing “power of women” derives from the increasing value
of their ability to produce quality children, and therefore, the model is consistent with the
roughly equal division of household resources within modern, monogamous marriages. In
addition, our analysis using data from Cote d’Ivoire conﬁrms all the main implications of
the model. In particular, we control for a man’s total income and show that polygyny
increases with non-labor income but decreases with labor income and education. This
result is consistent with the main prediction of our model: the sources of income, in addition
to the level of income, strongly determine the degree of polygynous behavior in the marriage
market.
It may be tempting to argue that the mystery of monogamy is easily explained by
bans on polygynous behavior in modern societies, or social norms in favor of monogamy.
We do not dismiss these factors as inconsequential, however, they are unlikely to be the
entire explanation for several reasons. First of all, bans on polygyny may seem to be
eﬀective in Western countries, but polygyny is also banned in many less-developed coun-
tries with persistently high rates of polygynous mating (Western Africa, Thailand, Egypt,
etc.). Clearly, bans on polygyny do not guarantee monogamy, precisely because of the
diﬃculty of enforcement — it is very hard to stop consenting adults from living together
and having children. Secondly, if there are eﬀective laws or norms against polygyny, how
did they arise? If their existence is independent from economic considerations, then norms
against polygyny should not be so strongly correlated with economic development, invest-
ments in child quality, assortative mating between high quality husbands and wives, and
the increasing power of women within the household and in society. Furthermore, our
analysis on Cote d’Ivoire shows that the diﬀerent sources of income explain variation in
the polygynous behavior of individuals within religion and area of residence, where social
norms about polygyny are likely to be constant.
3Therefore, it seems more likely that norms and economic motives work together
and reinforce each other. This line of reasoning follows Becker (1991) and Elster (1989),
who argue that although laws and norms may aﬀect behavior, they rarely evolve and are
maintained if personal incentives are very weak to uphold them. Our model should be
considered an attempt to explain how personal incentives align themselves with norms
at various stages of development. In particular, our model shows how the demand for
polygyny declines naturally in advanced countries, so that social norms can evolve and
reinforce a monogamous outcome. As a result, our model can help explain why norms in
favor of monogamy are strongly correlated with so many economic patterns listed above.
In addition, our model can be used to show within a simple political economy context
why monogamous norms and laws emerge in the ﬁrst place. Becker (1991) points out that,
in contrast to conventional wisdom, women are not the ones primarily harmed by polygyny,
since polygyny oﬀers additional options for women. The real victims of polygyny are poor
men, who may face very dim marriage prospects if they have to compete with rich men in a
polygynous market. Given that rich men usually exercise more political and social power
than poor men, rich men will only create laws or norms allowing for polygyny when their
beneﬁt from polygyny is high relative to the potential costs of social unrest stemming from
inequality in the marriage market. That is, in advanced countries, the political economy
gains for rich men of giving the “beneﬁt” of monogamy to poorer men outweighs the rather
small cost of limiting themselves to only one wife, which our model predicts is already the
equilibrium tendency. But, in poorer countries where the demand for polygyny by rich
men is high according to our model, the cost of limiting themselves to one woman is very
high, and therefore, the rich and powerful are likely to keep the privilege of polygyny for
themselves and deal with the potential wrath of the lower classes in other ways.
Considering the prevalence of polygyny throughout history and even today in many
less-developed economies, there is surprisingly very little written about this issue.3 Most
models about marriage behavior assume monogamous mating. Becker (1991) presents
the classic model of the marriage market which does allow for multiple partners, and
3It is somewhat debatable whether there is no polygyny in modern societies like the United States.
Even if we disregard certain Mormon groups which are explicitly polygynous, many men are “serial
monogamists” in the sense of marrying multiple wives in succession. This could be considered a form of
polygyny, and points to the overall diﬃculty in categorizing various societies over time as either polyg-
ynous or monogamous. The very deﬁnition of marriage is not comparable in all places and over time.
For example, concubines in China had certain privileges which were similar to wives, and the concept of
marriage in Africa today is not the same as in Western societies. However, despite all this variation,
our model seeks to explain the seemingly ubiquitous decline in polygyny in modern societies, using the
working deﬁnition of a “wife” as someone a man lives with and raises children with.
4shows that inequality in men naturally leads to polygyny. Becker’s analysis has been
extended by Bergstrom (1994a and 1994b), Guner (1999), Lagerlof (2002), and Edlund
and Lagerlof (2002). The focus of these papers is to analyze the degree of polygyny
within a less-developed economy, and investigate the interaction between the practice of
polygyny with a host of other marriage market institutions in agrarian economies such as
arranged marriages, dowries, bride prices, support of parents in old age, investments in
sons versus daughters, and the division of bequests to children. In contrast, our focus
is to explain why polygyny virtually disappears in advanced countries, and not on the
interaction of polygyny and the myriad of mostly primitive marriage market customs.
The existing models are limited in their ability to explain the downfall of polygyny in
advanced countries, since polygyny is very hard to rule out whenever there is inequality
in men. Consequently, our model is the ﬁrst to explain monogamy in the presence of
large and persistent inequality within men, and to link monogamous tendencies with the
increasing value of women in creating quality children.4
Many of the existing models also have predictions which are clearly speciﬁct ot h e
setting of an agrarian economy. For example, Becker (1991) predicts that polygyny is
positively associated with increasing transfers to the bride (“bride-prices”) and with the
increasing productivity of women in the output market.5 Both of these predictions have
strong empirical support in agrarian economies such as Africa (see Goode (1963), Gross-
bard (1976), and Jacoby (1995)). However, these predictions are problematic regarding
advanced economies where the productivity of women and the implicit bride price (bar-
gaining power) of women are the highest they have ever been. According to existing
models, the high productivity and bargaining power of women should be a sign of higher
rates of polygyny, not the virtual extinction of polygyny as we see today. In contrast,
our model is consistent with the decline in polygyny accompanied by the increasing bar-
4Lagerlof (2002) looks at the interaction of many of the various marriage market customs and practices
in a dynamic context, and consequently, does oﬀer an explanation for the decline in polygyny in advanced
countries. However, the explanation, while not the focus of the paper, relies on the elimination of inequality
to eliminate polygyny. In contrast, our model is the ﬁrst to explain monogamy when inequality is still
prevalent and sizeable.
5If female productivity in the market is associated with higher rates of polygyny in less developed
economies, it is not clear why the equilibrium prices of wives and outside labor in competitive marriage and
labor markets would not adjust to reduce the incidence of polygyny. Therefore, to explain the persistence of
polygyny in less-developed economies and the near extinction of polygyny in highly developed economies,
we focus on the primary function of a marriage - the production of child quantity and quality. The
production of children has no substitute in the outside labor market. Therefore, we focus on the role of
polygyny in determining the fundamental choice and trade-oﬀ between child quantity and quality that all
men and women make in both high and less-developed economies.
5gaining power of women in marriages, increasing productivity of women, and persistent
income inequality within men. We argue that while polygyny may increase bride prices
within agrarian-based societies, the existence of polygyny in general is a sign that wives
a r ei n e x p e n s i v e ,o re l s ew e a l t h ym e nw o u l dn o tb ea b l et oa ﬀo r dm o r et h a no n e .
This paper is also related to the recent research concerning marriage patterns, macro-
economic conditions, and inequality (see Kremer (1997), Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner
(2000), Fernandez and Rogerson (2001); Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2001)). This
literature mainly focuses on the eﬀect of assortative monogamous mating on the inequality
of household income. In contrast, we examine the reverse eﬀect of inequality on assortative
mating, and we consider assortative mating in terms of not only the quality of husbands and
wives, but also on the quantity of wives (i.e. assortative polygynous mating). However,
a main prediction of our model is that there will be higher rates of assortative mating
between men and women of higher quality in more advanced countries and in countries
where there is a higher skill premium. Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2001) provide
empirical evidence for these predictions, thus supporting our story behind the decline of
polygyny in advanced economies.
Finally, it is worth noting that monogamy is not just a mystery to economists. For
example, anthropologist Laura Betzig frequently questions why monogamy is so strongly
associated with development.6 Betzig (1995) writes:
That leaves me with my favorite question. When, and why did polygyny and
despotism end, and monogamy and democracy begin? Some people have said
6It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer the question of when and where monogamy began.
Betzig (1992, 1995) argues that the Greeks, Romans, and Europeans in the Middle Ages exhibited strong
polygynous tendencies — with rich men marrying multiple wives, or having children with concubines and
mistresses. Betzig (1995) argues that "polygynous mating died, or began its last gasps, after the Middle
Ages were over; and the Church probably had little to do with its demise." Her opinion is shared by
others. Posner (1992) writes about the widespread practice of concubinage in Greece and Rome. Also,
Pierre Grimal (1986) writes that "At no period in Roman history was the presence of a concubine in the
house considered discreditable" and that "In the course of time the institution of concubinage became a
sort of unoﬃcial marriage." Concerning "polygyny" in the Middle Ages, George Duby (1983) writes that
"Illegitimacy was a normal part of the structure of ordinary society — so normal that illegitimate children,
especially males, were neither concealed nor rejected." Jack Goody (1983) writes that "In Christian
Europe, however, concubinage was ‘illegal’ and its oﬀspring were illegitimate. Yet despite the constant
admonitions against it, the practice ﬂourished among laity and clerics alike." Concerning England in the
Middle Ages, Lawrence Stone (1977) writes that "In the early sixteenth century open maintenance of a
mistress — usually of lower-class origins — was perfectly compatible with a respected social position and
stable marriage . . . up to about 1560 they are often to be found leaving bequests to bastard children in
their wills. In practice, if not in theory, the early-sixteenth century nobility was a polygamous society."
Hence, it seems that, consistent with our theory, the emergence of monogamy coincides with the increasing
importance and spread of human capital in the Industrial Revolution. (see the survey of the evidence in
Galor and Moav (2004)).
6the Roman Empire was monogamous. This evidence is not persuasive. Others
have said monogamy began in the Middle Ages under the Catholic Church. But
political, economic, and even reproductive inequality seem to have characterized
medieval Europe too. It seems to me that one event changed all that: the switch
to an industrial economy in Europe in the past few centuries.
This paper oﬀers an explanation to this question.
2 The Model
In this section, we set up a general equilibrium model of the marriage market which allows
for polygynous matching. The goal is to determine which factors push the equilibrium
to be more polygynous or more monogamous, and to study under what circumstances
monogamy can exist at all. The underlying mechanism is based on the interaction of
polygynous mating with the trade-oﬀ between child quantity and child quality.
The model consists of a marriage market organized by contracts that specify the
allocation of resources within the household and investments in child quality. A key as-
sumption of the model is that skilled men and women have a comparative advantage in
raising quality children. Throughout the analysis, the term “skill” will refer to the level
of human capital and will be used interchangeably with the term “quality.” In this sense,
human capital should be thought of as both formal and informal schooling and training
both inside and outside the home.
The marriage market consists of two types of men and women - high and low quality.
T h ep r o p o r t i o no fm e na n dw o m e nw i t hh i g hh u m a nc a p i t a li sd e n o t e db yθ.M e n a r e
allowed to oﬀer women of either type a marriage contract, and if she accepts, they get
married and have two children, a boy and a girl.7 A marriage contract consists of three
components: (1) a “price” which speciﬁes an income transfer from the husband to the wife
for her personal consumption, (2) a human capital level for their oﬀspring which requires
a certain investment by the household, and (3) a “bequest” to the wife’s children for their
consumption. Thus, the contract speciﬁes the division of household resources between the
man, his wife or wives, and each child. Moreover, the contract speciﬁes whether resources
7Since the goal of this paper is to study the distribution of the number of wives across men, we
normalize the number of children each woman bears to two - a boy and a girl. Thus, we will not try to
e x p l a i np o l y g y n yw i t ha ni m b a l a n c e ds e x - r a t i o ,w h i c hc o u l da l s or e s u l tf r o my o u n g e rw o m e nm a r r y i n g
older men in a growing population. It would be trivial to develop a model with men marrying multiple
women if there are a lot more women than men. We believe that sex-ratios may be an important factor,
but they cannot explain the broad correlation between development and monogamy.
7are transferred to the children in the form of investments in their human capital and/or
bequests in the form of income. Men are allowed to marry as many wives as they wish
subject to their budget constraint. Furthermore, we assume that men earn income in the
labor market and women do not.8
An individual’s preferences are deﬁned over their own consumption, the number of
their children, and their children’s income which may take the form of bequests and/or
human capital. In particular, a man’s preferences are represented by the following utility
function:
u
m =l nc +l n [ n(x + b)] (1)
where c is his own consumption, n is the number of wives he marries (which equivalently
is half the number of his children), x ∈ {1,h} is the quality level (human capital) of
his children, and b is the bequest per pair of children.9 If x =1 , his children will grow
up to be “unskilled”, and if x = h>1, his children will grow up to become “skilled.”
Thus, we assume that each woman’s son and daughter are either both skilled or unskilled,
although the levels of human capital and the type of human capital could diﬀer between
boys and girls. Also, we make no assumption about the distribution of bequests between
a woman’s two children.10 An alternative formulation would be to explicitly specify an
unequal distribution of bequests and/or level of skill investments — perhaps by giving more
education to boys versus girls or by giving more bequests to the ﬁrst born male (a practice
called “primogeniture”).11 However, the results of the model rely only on the existence
of variation within boys and girls in human capital levels (regardless of the diﬀerences in
types or levels of human capital between the two sexes), and the results are robust to
specifying an equal division of bequests or using a “primogeniture” rule of giving only to
8For reasons stated in the introduction, we do not believe that the productivity of women in the labor
market can explain the decline in polygyny, since existing models suggest that increasing productivity of
women in the agrarian economies leads to more polygyny. Therefore, we abstract from the issue of female
labor.
9We follow the marriage market models of Becker (1991) and Bergstrom (1994) by making the number
of wives a continuous variable. As noted by Bergstrom (1994) and Becker (1991), a fraction of a wife can
be considered the expected number of years married to a wife or the fraction of men married.
10These assumptions imply that there are always an equal number of skilled men and women in the
population, and an equal number of unskilled men and women. This serves to keep the sex-ratio within
skill levels constant so that we can isolate other factors which aﬀect the rate of polygyny and/or monogamy.
In addition, this assumption implies that we are abstracting from issues concerning how marriage markets
may interact with a gender bias in favor of sons or daughters. See Edlund and Lagerloﬀ (2002) for an
extensive analysis of some of these issues.
11See Chu (1991) and Bergstrom (1994b) who suggest that the practice of primogeniture can be used
to increase the survival rate of a dynasty.
8the ﬁrst born son.12
A woman’s utility function is assumed to be identical to the man’s utility function,
subject to the restriction that women do not choose the number of their children, which
is assumed to be restricted by biological constraints and normalized to two. Therefore,
a woman’s utility function depends only on her consumption and the income of her two
children, represented by,
u
f =l ny +l n ( x + b)
where y is the consumption transfer (the “price”) she receives from her husband, x ∈ {1,h}
is her children’s skill level, and b is her children’s bequest.
To raise skilled children, parents have to invest resources in their children’s human
capital. However, skilled parents are assumed to be more eﬃcient in the production of
skilled children. In other words, skilled parents have a comparative advantage in producing
skilled children. Hence, if both parents are skilled, the cost for educating both of the wife’s
children is e. If only one parent is skilled, the cost is higher and is denoted by ¯ e where
¯ e>e . If both parents are unskilled, the cost is assumed to be prohibitively high so that
both children will grow up to be unskilled.
A man’s income is composed of two components: labor income and non-labor income
(such as land, physical capital, corruption, etc.). Labor income is determined by his human
capital level, and thus is equal to h if he is skilled and 1 if he is not. In addition, non-labor
income is equal to L for skilled men and λ for unskilled men. Thus, a man’s total income,
denoted by I, is I =1+λ if the man is unskilled or I = h+L if he is skilled. The income




Therefore, there are two sources of inequality — inequality from diﬀerences in human capital,
and inequality which is due to disparities in non-labor income. In this framework, h
represents the what we call the “importance” or the “value” of human capital, but more
precisely, h represents both the return to human capital and the level of human capital.
In this sense, h measures the importance of human capital in determining the level and
distribution of income in a society.
In this general formulation, we can analyze any given level of inequality between
the two types of men, and for any given level of inequality, we can analyze whether the
12In other words, our assumption could easily be relaxed so that the boy always gets more education,
and perhaps a diﬀerent type of education, than the girl. The only critical part of the assumption is that
the decision to give some education to the boy is correlated with the education of the girl.
9composition of inequality between the two sources of income inﬂuences the equilibrium level
of polygynous matching. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that non-labor income is
not distributed in a way so that unskilled men are richer than skilled men (i.e. we assume
0 <r<1).
Men allocate their income between their own consumption and the agreed upon level
of resources transferred to each wife and her children. For simplicity, we assume that each
man marries only one type of woman (skilled or unskilled), and oﬀers identical contracts
to all women within the same type.13 Therefore, a man’s budget constraint is:
c + n(y + εe + b)=I (2)
where y is the price paid to each wife, ε =0if they raise low quality children, ε =1if they
raise high quality children, e ∈ {e, ¯ e} is the cost per wife of raising quality children, and n
is the number of wives he marries.
3A n a l y s i s
An equilibrium is characterized by a set of marriage contracts which satisfy the following
properties. First, men and women maximize their utility subject to their budget con-
straints. Second, there is no marriage contract that a man can oﬀer to a woman that
would make him better oﬀ without making the woman worse oﬀ. Third, the marriage
market clears by all women getting married, which implies that two men of the same type
could marry diﬀerent types of women. For example, some skilled men might marry skilled
women while other skilled men might marry unskilled women. In these cases, however,
i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tm e nw i l lb ei n d i ﬀerent between marrying one type of women or a
combination of both types in equilibrium.
The optimal contract solves a maximization problem where all men and women
are trying to procure their own consumption, while contracting over the amount of the
resources transferred to their children — which is basically a “public good” in the sense that
both parents derive utility from their children’s human capital and bequests. Formally,
every man oﬀers a marriage contract, consisting of y,ε and b, to each type of woman
in order to maximize his utility (1) subject to his budget constraint (2), and subject to
matching alternative marriage oﬀers for any given type of woman:
lny +l n ( x + b) ≥ U (3)
13As will become apparent, in equilibrium, men cannot increase their utility by oﬀering diﬀerent contracts
to the same type of woman, or by marrying diﬀerent types of women.
10where U is the utility level of alternative marriage oﬀers for that type of women, which
is taken as given by any man. This maximization problem has to be solved for all
possible combinations of contracts between types of men and women and for both levels
of investment in the human capital of children.
We now establish several basic results of this model, leaving the technical derivations
to the appendix. The consumption level of a skilled man is determined by:
c = n(y + εe + b)=( h + L)/2 (4)
while an unskilled man’s consumption level is:
c = n(y + εe + b)=( 1+λ)/2 (5)
An implication of equations (4) and (5), which simpliﬁes the analysis, is that a man’s
consumption level is related only to his income and not to the number and type of his wives,
and not to the skill level or bequest level of his children. That is, half of a man’s income
is spent on consumption and half is spent on women and children.
The equilibrium “prices” (consumption transfers) for each type of woman turns out
to be determined by the type of children she raises and the value of human capital in the
economy. Let yss be the price for a skilled woman who raises skilled children, yus is the
price for an unskilled woman who raises skilled children, and µ is the price for any type of
woman who raises unskilled children. These are the only prices which exist in equilibrium,











Therefore, a woman’s consumption level is always equal to half the net value of her
children’s human capital. If she raises skilled children, her consumption level is half of
the diﬀerence between the value of skill, h, and the cost for that household to raise skilled
children (e if she is skilled and e if she is not skilled). The consumption level of a woman
who raises unskilled children is also equal to half the value of unskilled human capital
(normalized to equal one) minus the cost (which is zero). Thus, women always capture
half of the net value of her children’s human capital for her own consumption. More
importantly, these results show that the value of women in the marriage market is directly
linked to the quality of her children.
11We now establish the equilibrium patterns of matching between the two types of
men and women, and how this matching interacts with the diﬀerent levels of investment
in their children’s human capital.
Lemma 1 If both parents are skilled, they raise skilled children if and only if h ≥ h, where
h ≡ 1+e. If one parent is skilled and the other is not, then they raise skilled children if
and only if h ≥ h, where h ≡ 1+e.
Lemma 1 simply states that when both parents are skilled, and thus have the lowest
costs for raising skilled children, they will only do so if the value of human capital is
suﬃciently high. If h =1+e, two skilled parents would be indiﬀerent between spending
e and having skilled children who will have an income of h,o rs p e n d i n ge through a
bequest and having unskilled child with an equivalent income of 1+e. Therefore, when
h>h=1+e, two skilled parents can give more income to their children for the same
cost by investing in their quality rather than giving the equivalent amount as a bequest.
A similar idea holds for mixed couples where one is skilled and the other is not, but the
threshold level of h is higher because of the higher costs of producing skilled children.
Therefore, mixed couples only have skilled children when h>h =1+e.
Lemma 2 If there is an unskilled woman that raises skilled children, then all skilled women
raise skilled children.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward; skilled women have a comparative
advantage in raising skilled children, so if couples where the woman is unskilled choose to
invest in their children’s quality, then it is also eﬃcient for couples with skilled women to
do the same. This idea is also true for couples with skilled men, as the following lemma
states.
Lemma 3 If there is an unskilled man that raises skilled children, then all skilled men
raise skilled children.
Due to the lower costs of raising skilled children, Lemmas 2 and 3 say that skilled
men and women are always more likely to incur the costs of investing in their children’s
human capital. However, these results should not be obvious, because raising high quality
children is costly, and therefore, all men face a trade-oﬀ between marrying more wives and
investing in their children’s quality. It turns out that although skilled men always invest
at least as many resources as unskilled men in the human capital of their children, they
also marry at least as many women as unskilled men.
12Lemma 4 If polygyny exists, only skilled men are polygynous.
Lemma 4 implies that skilled men, who are richer than unskilled men, always marry
at least one wife, which means that skilled men always marry at least as many wives as
unskilled men. This has to be true because if one group is polygynous, the other group
cannot be polygynous, since the number of men and women are equal.
Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that if parents invest in raising skilled children, there will
be assortative mating in the marriage market in the sense that skilled men will tend to
marry skilled women. In fact, it can easily be shown that skilled women only marry skilled
m e ni na n ye q u i l i b r i u mw h e r eh>h , although some skilled men may still marry unskilled
women and have unskilled children with them.
We now know that only rich (i.e. skilled) man are candidates to be polygynous.
The following propositions determine the equilibrium degree of polygynous matching in
the marriage market, and under what conditions monogamy is a possibility. To do this,
we take as given the level of inequality, costs of human capital, and total income for each
type of men (i.e. r, h + L, 1+λ, e, and e are constant), and see how changes in the
composition of inequality (i.e. changes in h as h + L is held constant) determine the rate
of polygyny in the marriage market. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the following propositions
by graphing the number of wives and the price of wives (the consumption transfer) when
only the composition of inequality is changing. Proofs for the following propositions are
derived in the appendix.
The ﬁrst proposition describes the equilibrium when the value of human capital, h,
is suﬃciently low, so that the rich men are richer predominantly because of their non-labor
income L.
Proposition 1 If h<h , then:
(i) The degree of polygyny is independent of h.
(ii) Skilled men are polygynous.
(iii) No one invests in child quality.
This proposition states that when the return to human capital (relative to the costs)
is suﬃciently low, the richer men (skilled men) can aﬀord more wives than the poorer,
unskilled men. This result stems from the low value of wives in the marriage market
when the value of human capital is low, making polygyny aﬀordable for the richer, skilled
men. Quality wives are inexpensive because the value of human capital is so low that
even skilled men have no interest in producing quality children with skilled women, who
13provide the lowest cost of producing skilled children (see Lemma 1). Since quality in
children is not valued, quality in women is also not valued in the marriage market, because
quality in women is valued only for helping to produce quality children. This idea is
represented by equations (6), which state that the “price” of a woman (the consumption
transfer to the wife) in the marriage market is directly linked to the quality of her children.
Consequently, when the value of human capital is very low, women are valued only for
the quantity of children they can produce, which is assumed to be identical, and not their
quality. All women have equal value when no one produces quality children, and therefore,
all women have identical contracts in equilibrium when h<h(depicted in Figures 1 and
2). Naturally, since there is a single price for all women, wealthier men can aﬀord more
of them in comparison to poorer, unskilled men.
Proposition 1 also states that the degree of polygyny is independent of h, implying
that the rate of polygyny depends only on the level of inequality, not the composition of
inequality. Again, this results from the fact that men do not care about the quality level of
their wives when the value of human capital is too low to invest in child quality. So, when
h is suﬃciently low, rich men use their wealth to acquire “quantity” in wives and children,
rather than investing in child quality. The quantity of wives that rich men can aﬀord is
determined by the uniform price for all wives in the market, which is determined by the
aggregate level of income in the economy, not the diﬀerent sources of income.14 Therefore,
the diﬀerences in total income between the rich and poor men determine the diﬀerences
in their number of wives, and thus, the rate of polygyny. Since Proposition 1 holds the
level of inequality and the incomes of both types of men constant as h changes, the degree
of polygyny is constant as long as h<h . Therefore, when the value of human capital
is suﬃciently low, polygynous behavior depends only on whether you are rich enough to
aﬀord more than one wife, and not how you got that way.
When the value of human capital is suﬃciently high, however, a diﬀerent pattern
emerges.
Proposition 2 If h ≤ h<h,t h e n :
(i) The degree of polygyny declines with h.
14Because all women raise unskilled children and the price (the consumption transfer) is always deter-
mined by the quality of their children, the consumption transfer is independent of the level or composition
of aggregate income when the value of human capital is suﬃciently low (h<h ). However, the bequests
given to each child are determined by aggregate income — so while bequests are not dependent on the
composition of income in this region, they do increase with aggregate income. Thus the “full price” of a
wife (the price plus the bequest plus investment in human capital) is not dependent on the composition
of income in this region, but is dependent on the level of aggregate income.
14(ii) Skilled men who marry skilled wives invest in child quality, while skilled men
who marry unskilled wives do not invest in child quality.
Proposition 2 states that polygyny cannot be ruled out even when the value of human
capital is suﬃciently high to entice skilled men to raise quality children with skilled women.
When the value of human capital is above h, it is now eﬃcient for skilled men to invest in
child quality, but only with skilled women who have a comparative advantage in producing
quality children over unskilled women (see Lemma 1). As a result, skilled and unskilled
women diﬀer in the type of children they raise when h lies within this region, so the value
of skilled women in the marriage market is not identical to unskilled women (see equations
(6)). Thus, skilled women are valued for the quality and not just the quantity of children
they produce.
Figure 1 shows that some skilled men marry a certain number (≥ 1) of skilled women
and have skilled children, while other skilled men marry a greater number of unskilled
women and raise unskilled children. The reason that the latter group marries a greater
number of women is because they are being compensated for lower quality with higher
quantity of children. This result is enabled by the lower cost of unskilled women in
equilibrium — the “full price” (the consumption transfer plus bequest level and human
capital investment) is lower for unskilled women because of the low human capital of their
children. However, both of these strategies must yield the same utility for any given skilled
man in equilibrium. Therefore, skilled men are indiﬀerent between choosing either the
“quantity” or “quality” strategy of choosing wives and children.
Proposition 2 also states the key result of the model: the rate of polygyny depends on
the composition of income and inequality, and not just the levels. Figure 1 shows that as
h increases while the total incomes of skilled and unskilled men are held ﬁxed, the average
number of wives per skilled man declines. Interestingly, as h increases in this region, the
skilled men who marry unskilled women and raise unskilled children marry more and more
wives relative to the skilled men who go for “quality.” However, there are fewer and fewer
skilled men who go for “quantity” as h increases, because the value of quality is increasing
with h. Thus, the skilled men who marry the unskilled women need to be compensated
with more and more quantity. But, since fewer skilled men are going for “quantity,”
the average number of wives per skilled man declines over this region of h (h <h<h).
Therefore, the rate of polygyny declines as the value of human capital increases, even after
holding constant the level of income and inequality between the two types of men.
The intuition for this result stems from the increasing value of child quality, and
15consequently, the increasing demand for quality in women as the value of human capital
increases. The return to investing e and having a skilled child with a skilled wife is
increasing with the value of human capital h. But, because skilled men will only raise
skilled children with skilled women (see Lemma 1), the demand for skilled women increases
relative to unskilled women as h increases within this region. Income levels are held
constant throughout this exercise, so skilled men can aﬀord fewer and fewer skilled women
as their price increases with h. T h u s ,t h er a t eo fp o l y g y n yf a l l sa si n c o m ei sd e t e r m i n e d
more and more by human capital and less by non-labor income.
One way to interpret our results is the following: male inequality creates polygyny,
but female inequality reduces it. As h increases, male inequality is increasingly determined
by diﬀerences in human capital, and the value of quality in children also rises. As a result,
the demand for quality women increases, since they are a complementary factor in the
production of quality children. Thus, variation in the quality of women translates into
inequality in the value of women, making it too expensive for rich men to aﬀord multiple
wives of high quality. Therefore, male inequality stemming from diﬀerences in human
capital translates into inequality in the quality, not the quantity, of their wives. Becker
(1991) calls this “implicit polygyny,” in recognition of the trade-oﬀ in the quantity and
quality of wives. Our model shows that the degree of implicit versus explicit polygyny
depends crucially on the sources of male inequality — the sources of inequality determine the
level of inequality in women, and therefore, the form of inequality in the marriage market.
Thus, as long as male inequality persists, diﬀerences in female inequality across societies
is needed to explain the mystery behind why certain societies tend towards monogamy or
polygyny.
A further result of the model when h <h<h is that there will be higher rates of
assortative mating between men and women according to their skill level as h increases.
This is true because the number of skilled men who marry unskilled women declines with
h over this region. That is, the increasing value of skilled women causes skilled men to
switch away from unskilled women. This result is consistent with the results of Fernandez,
Guner, and Knowles (2001), who show that the degree of assortative matching by education
levels increases with the return to human capital in advanced countries.15 Therefore, our
15It should be noted that Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2001) restrict their analysis to developed
countries which are monogamous. Interestingly, they show that the return to human capital is signiﬁcant
in determining how important it is for educated men to match with educated women, which implies that
educated men and women do not match simply because they "have good conversation", which should be
independent of the return to human capital. The fact that matching based on quality is related to the
return to quality is consistent with our model.
16model correctly predicts that the rate of assortative matching across quality levels of men
and women will be related to the value of human capital.
Since skilled men marry fewer wives as inequality is determined more by human
capital, it must also be the case that the number of wives per unskilled man increases over
the region where h <h<h (see Figure 1). This result stems from the declining demand
by skilled men for unskilled women over this region, lowering the price of unskilled women
and making them more aﬀordable for unskilled men.16 The equilibrium tends to be more
monogamous as h increases over this region, but reaching a monogamous equilibrium is
not guaranteed for all parameter values. A necessary condition for monogamy is that
h <h<h, so monogamy cannot occur if h is too low or too high relative to the costs.
The following proposition illustrates how the existence of monogamy is related to the levels
of inequality within men and women.
Proposition 3 Monogamy exists if and only if e − e ≥ 1−r
r .
The left-hand side of the equation in Proposition (3), e − e, measures the compar-
ative advantage of skilled women in the production of skilled children. If there were no
diﬀerences in the costs of producing quality children between skilled and unskilled women,
this term would be zero and all women would be equal in the marriage market, leading
to polygyny. The right-hand side of the equation, 1−r
r , is positively related to the level
of male income inequality. In fact, this term can be re-written as
(h+L)−(1+λ)
(1+λ) , which
equals the percentage diﬀerence in income between skilled and unskilled men. If there is
more income inequality within men, the likelihood that monogamy will characterize the
equilibrium decreases.
Proposition (3) essentially states that monogamy can only exist if the comparative
advantage of skilled women in producing skilled children is large enough in relation to the
relative wealth of the rich men in the economy. That is, higher male inequality generates
more polygyny, since rich men will use their wealth to acquire more wives and children.
But, a larger comparative advantage for skilled women generates higher inequality for
women in their value on the marriage market, thus making polygyny less aﬀordable for
rich men who want quality wives. So, Proposition 3 basically emphasizes our previous
results: male inequality generates polygyny, while female inequality generates monogamy.
16The “price” for unskilled women in terms of the consumption transfer is constant over the region where
h <h<h, because the value of unskilled children is constant. However, the "full price" of unskilled
women includes the bequest levels, which are falling as h increases over this region. Thus, the full price
of unskilled women decreases over this region, because of the declining demand for unskilled women by
skilled men as h increases.
17W en o wa n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r eh>h, however, we will argue later that this range is
not likely to be relevant for the comparison between developed and less-developed countries.
Proposition 4 If h ≥ h, then:
(i) The degree of polygyny increases with h.
(ii) Skilled men are polygynous.
(iii) All skilled men invest in child quality, regardless of the skill level of their wives.
When the value of human capital exceeds h,i ti sn o we ﬃcient for skilled men to
have skilled children with either skilled or unskilled women (see Lemma 1). So, when h
is suﬃciently high, unskilled women are also valued for the skilled children they are able
to produce. Therefore, the value of skilled women in the marriage market falls relative to
unskilled women when h is above h. When h is below h, skilled women could extract the
increasing value of human capital as h increases for themselves as private consumption,
because the value of their ability to produce quality children increased relative to unskilled
women. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2 as the prices for skilled and unskilled
women diverge as h increases over the region where h<h.
But, when h is above h, skilled women no longer are necessary to produce skilled
children, because the value of human capital is high enough so that skilled men are now
willing to incur the higher costs of producing skilled children with unskilled women. In this
scenario, skilled women cannot extract as much of the increasing value of human capital
for themselves, because they are now more substitutable with unskilled women. Moreover,
the degree of substitutability increases as h increases over the region where h>h, because
skilled men are more and more willing to marry unskilled women because it is increasingly
eﬃcient to do so and still have skilled children. Therefore, the comparative advantage of
skilled women in producing skilled children declines as h increases, as shown in Figure 2
where the prices of skilled and unskilled women increase at the same rate, which implies
that the relative price of skilled women falls with h.
Because all women are becoming more similar as h increases above h,f e m a l ei n -
equality declines and polygyny increases as the full price (the consumption transfer, the
bequest, and the human capital investment) falls. Essentially, the market power that
skilled women have when h is below h is now transferred to skilled men — since skilled men
a r en o wt h es c a r c er e s o u r c en e e d e dt op r o d u c eq u a l i t yc h i l d r e nw h e nh is above h. Thus,
skilled men use their increasing bargaining power to lower the full price of all women and
acquire more wives, despite the fact that only the composition of income has changed, and
not the levels.
18The ﬂip side of the story is that unskilled men marry fewer and fewer women as
h increases above h. Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that unskilled men face
increasingly stiﬀ competition from skilled men for unskilled women, since skilled men are
increasingly willing to have skilled children with unskilled women as h rises. The model
assumes that it is prohibitively expensive for unskilled men to have skilled children with
unskilled women, so in order to compensate unskilled women for not having skilled children,
unskilled men have to increase the bequests to their children as h increases. Thus, the
full price of unskilled women who have unskilled children (the consumption transfer plus
bequest) is increasing over this region, making it more expensive for unskilled men to
acquire a wife. Therefore, polygyny increases as skilled and unskilled men increasingly
compete for the same women, and skilled men exploit their comparative advantage in
producing skilled children by acquiring more and more wives.
Finally, we conclude this section by discussing how polygyny is aﬀected by the overall
level of inequality. The entire analysis in Propositions 1 - 4 held the total level of income
for each group, and consequently, the level of inequality between the groups, constant as
h w a sf r e et ov a r y . A ta n yl e v e lo fh, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 Given h, the degree of polygyny increases with increasing inequality (r
declines).
This proposition states that increases in inequality resulting from increasing dispar-
ities in non-labor income increase polygyny. The converse, however, is not true: increases
in inequality stemming from bigger disparities in the value of human capital (i.e. r declines
because h increases) will increase polygyny if h<hor h>h, but polygyny may or may
not increase if h <h<h. This ambiguity is due to two eﬀects opposing eﬀects: (1)
an increase in inequality tends to make men more polygynous, and (2) an increase in the
composition of wealth derived from human capital decreases polygyny. Therefore, the
total eﬀect on polygyny depends on which eﬀect dominates. All of these results together
show that the degree of polygyny is dependent not only on the level of inequality, as em-
phasized in the existing literature, but also the composition of inequality. Both of these
factors determine whether male inequality manifests itself as inequality in the number of
their wives, or the quality of their wives.
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4.1 Is polygyny bad for growth?
Inferences from the model about growth are straightforward using standard assumptions
about the relationship between growth and the accumulation of human and physical capi-
tal. All of the results presented in the previous section are true for any level of aggregate
human capital in the economy, represented by the proportion of skilled individuals in the
economy, θ. However, the proportion of skilled individuals in the next period will depend
on the value of human capital h and the costs of producing human capital (e and e).
If h is lower than h, then the return to human capital (relative to the costs) is too
low for even skilled men to invest in child quality with skilled women. Thus, the next
generation will consist of no children with high human capital. Even rich families will
invest minimal resources in the quality of their children, leading the economy to converge
to a low aggregate level of human capital. In addition, because rich men will tend to spend
their income on multiple women and children, the amount of physical capital leftover for
each child will also diminish over time. If we assume that growth is dependent on the
accumulation of physical and human capital, we can infer that economies in the ﬁrst region
of Figure 1 will ﬁnd it very hard to break out of the poverty trap if polygyny allows the
wealthier men to use their income to acquire quantity rather than quality women and
children. That is, polygyny can be considered an “engine of decline” for countries with
low levels of human capital, because polygyny allows rich men to spend their money on
quantity rather than investing in child quality (in the form of physical or human capital
investment in each child).
If, however, countries with low h enforced a ban on polygyny, the ban will prevent
rich men from spending their income on quantity, and force them to invest in quality. It
c a nb es h o w nt h a ta ne n f o r c e db a no np o l y g y n yi nt h eﬁrst or second regions of Figure
1( h<h) will result in higher bequests per child, thus allowing for a faster accumulation
of physical capital which should lead to higher values of human capital, assuming that
physical and human capital are complements in the production process. Thus, a strictly
e n f o r c e db a no np o l y g y n yi nc o u n t r i e sw i t hs u ﬃciently low h could help lead the economy
to grow and develop to the point where h grows further into the second region of Figure 1
(h <h<h), where the rate of polygyny declines with h. In this sense, an enforced ban on
polygyny could help the economy grow and develop to the point where polygyny naturally
declines with growth — possibly to the point where the equilibrium becomes monogamous
20and the ban would be superﬂuous.
If the economy is in the third region of Figure 1 (h>h), skilled men are marrying
multiple skilled and unskilled women and having skilled children with both types. Rather
than spending their money just on quantity, rich men in this region use their income to
produce quality children with multiple wives. As a result, the proportion of skilled people
will increase over time, generating economic growth. Therefore, polygyny at very high
values of human capital can actually be considered an “engine of growth,” since polygyny
acts as the “technology” which allows skilled men to multiply their type at a high rate. If
polygyny was eﬀectively banned in this economy, the proportion of skilled people would
remain constant over time (θ is constant).
Over time, h is likely to converge to the second range of Figure 1 (h <h<h) if
the return to skill is determined in the labor market by its marginal product and there is
some degree of complementarity in the aggregate production process between skilled and
unskilled workers. Suppose h<h , then no one will invest in high quality children, and
therefore, the return to quality would rise so that h will increase to a level above h. On
the other hand, h larger than h implies that the supply of skilled workers increases over
time, reducing the return to skill until the economy reaches a steady-state in which h is
no longer larger than h. Thus, h is likely to be of intermediate values (h <h<h) in any
steady state.
4.2 Why are developed countries more monogamous than less-
developed countries?
In the context of the model, we can think of a developed country as having a high value
of human capital h relative to the costs of producing human capital (e and e)c o m p a r e d
to poorer countries. As discussed above, h represents both the return and the level of
human capital. Thus, in developed countries, h can be associated with a college degree
whereas an unskilled worker can be associated with a high school dropout. In a poor
economy, in contrast, h can represent a worker who graduated elementary school, and an
unskilled worker is literate at most. Under this interpretation, h is likely to be larger in
advanced countries. But, one might also think that the cost of becoming skilled is higher
in advanced economies. However, the ratios of h to e and e a r el i k e l yt ob eh i g h e ri nt h e
advanced economy, because parents with higher levels of human capital are more eﬀective
in producing quality children (see Moav (2001)).
Therefore, assuming that economies typically lie within the second region of Figure
211( h <h<h) for reasons stated above, h in poorer countries is likely to be closer to
h =1+e, while h in richer countries is likely to be closer to h =1+e. According
to Proposition 2, this implies that richer countries should be more monogamous, since
inequality is determined more by diﬀerences in human capital, while inequality in poorer
countries is determined more by diﬀerences in non-labor income (land, physical capital,
corruption, etc.).17 As a result, male inequality in poorer countries tends to manifest itself
as inequality in the number of wives per man, while male inequality in advanced countries
translates into higher inequality in the quality of wives per man.
An alternative approach for comparing developed to less-developed countries would
be to examine diﬀerences in the proportion of rich men who are rich because of their
human capital versus rich men who are wealthy because of their non-labor income. That
is, we could extend the model to allow for two types of rich men, and developed countries
would be characterized by having a greater proportion of rich men who acquire their wealth
through human capital. In this framework, it is straightforward to show that the rate
of polygyny would decline with development (i.e. with increases in the proportion of rich
men who are skilled), as predicted by the current setup of the model.
4.3 What about laws and norms against polygyny?
It may be tempting to explain the mystery of monogamy by pointing to explicit bans and
informal norms against polygyny in advanced societies. However, banning polygyny does
not guarantee the absence of polygynous behavior. Sometimes bans on polygyny appear to
be binding, as in most Western countries, but in many cases these bans are ineﬀective and
unenforced, as seen by persistently high rates of polygyny in many undeveloped countries
including those in Western Africa (see the analysis in the next section). The problem
w i t hb a n n i n gp o l y g y n yi st h a ti ti sa l m o s ti m p o s s i b l et oe n f o r c e : t h es t a t ec a nd e c i d en o t
to recognize polygynous marriage, but it is not easy to stop consenting adults from living
together and having children. Banning the formal institution of polygynous marriage does
not necessarily eliminate polygynous behavior, which is the subject of this paper.
Consequently, we follow Becker (1991) who argues that bans on polygyny in richer
countries only seem to be eﬀective because there is little demand for polygynous behavior.
It is hard to imagine that many men in the United States would become polygynous if
the laws against polygyny were suddenly repealed. However, it is tempting to think that
17The overall level of inequality is usually higher in poorer countries, so this may also contribute to their
higher rates of polygyny (see Lagerlof (2002)). Also, see footnote 1 in the introduction for evidence that
inequality is more dependent on human capital in advanced countries.
22this is explained by informal norms against polygyny. But, norms are similar to laws
in that they are unlikely to be followed if the cost of doing so is high. Elster (1989)
argues that while “social norms can act as a restraint on rationality,” it is also true that
“rationality acts as a constraint on social norms.” So, even if social norms do constrain
polygynous behavior, it is diﬃcult to imagine that norms have nothing to do with economic
incentives, and yet are so correlated with economic development, investments in child
quality, assortative mating between high quality husbands and wives, and increasing power
for women within the household and in society. In addition, we demonstrate in the next
section that polygynous behavior is correlated with economic variables within religious
groups in the same geographic area of Cote d’Ivoire, where norms concerning polygyny
should be constant. Thus, our model should be seen as an attempt to explain why
rational incentives for monogamy are much stronger in advanced countries, and therefore,
these stronger incentives most likely interact with social norms to reinforce each other in
order to create a more monogamous equilibrium.
One might also argue that men would not become polygynous in modern societies if
polygyny were legalized because women would never want to be in a polygynous marriage.
Again, this is likely to be explained by norms which are reinforced by rational incentives.
Looking at what women “want” or demand is only half of the story. It is hard to imagine
that women in less-developed countries want or demand fewer resources in the marriage
than women in advanced countries. Our model shows why women are valued as a cheap
commodity in poor countries, while the value of quality women in rich countries drives
up their status and bargaining power to the point where polygyny is very expensive.
Therefore, our model explains why women in advanced countries tend to receive more in
equilibrium based on rational behavior, and this tendency likely contributes to the creation
of social norms — which reinforce each other to create stronger “preferences” for monogamy
in advanced countries.
To be more speciﬁc, our model can be used to show why laws and norms against
polygyny emerge in advanced economies within a political economy framework. Becker
(1991) points out that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, women are not the ones nec-
essarily harmed by the practice of polygyny. In principle, polygyny does not force women
into polygynous marriages, it only keeps the option open for them, and therefore, increases
their value in the marriage market.18 In many cases, women will prefer to be the second
18Posner (1992) also makes this point, but points out that women in polygynous societies may not have
the option to be in a monogamous marriage if the man can always marry more women later. Posner
states, however, that this problem is often solved with marriage contracts which can force the man to
23wife of a wealthy man who can provide for her and her children over a poor man who
cannot. So, the people who really suﬀer from polygyny are actually poor men, who may
face very dim marriage and reproductive prospects if they have to compete with rich men
in a polygynous market. Higher rates of polygyny, therefore, are likely to be associated
with increasing social unrest stemming from a larger mass of frustrated poor men.
In a simple model where rich men control a disproportionately large inﬂuence over
laws and social norms, it is unlikely that rich men will create laws or norms which are
very costly to themselves relative to the political beneﬁts. So, when rich men naturally
have a low demand for polygynous behavior, they will tend to placate the lower classes by
banning polygyny (formally or with informal norms) and making marriage more accessible
to the masses. That is, in advanced countries, the political economy gains for rich men
of giving the “beneﬁt” of monogamy to poorer men outweighs the rather small costs of
limiting themselves to only one wife, which our model predicts is already the equilibrium
tendency. But, in poorer countries, our model shows that the cost of limiting themselves
to one woman is very high, and therefore, the rich and powerful are likely to keep this
privilege for themselves and deal with the potential wrath of the lower classes in other
ways. Thus, the political economy equilibrium is reinforced by the magnitude of the
demand for polygyny by the rich men in the society, which our model shows is dependent
on the value of human capital.
Finally, to see how norms and private incentives can interact and reinforce each other,
consider the ban on polygyny by the Christian Church. The ban on polygyny was one of
m a n ys e x u a lr e f o r m sb yt h eC h u r c hw h i c ht o o kt i m et ob ee ﬀective (see Posner (1992) and
Betzig (1992, 1995)), most likely due to the high demand for polygyny prior to the increase
in the importance of human capital. However, economic growth likely triggered a positive
feedback between investments in human capital, the natural growth of monogamy, and
am o r ee ﬀective ban on polygyny. In this manner, social norms and rational incentives
can interact with economic growth to reinforce each other and create an advanced, highly
monogamous economy.
live up to a monogamous commitment. Bergstrom (1994a) clariﬁe sw h oi sh u r tb yp o l y g y n yf u r t h e rb y
showing that monogamy beneﬁts women who marry wealthy men and it hurts the rest of the women who
marry poorer men.
245 Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is to provide empirical support for the main assumptions and
conclusions of the model. While this is not a formal test or estimation of the model
parameters, a model of monogamy and polygyny should be consistent with the patterns
in the data. Many of the predictions of the model are already supported by existing
evidence. For example, the model predicts that monogamy should be correlated with
richer countries where income depends more on labor versus non-labor income.19 The
model is also consistent with higher rates of assortative mating based on education levels
when the return to human capital is higher (Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2001)). In
addition, the model predicts that wives should be more expensive in monogamous societies,
which is exempliﬁed by the roughly equal division of household resources in marriages in
modern societies. To provide further evidence, this section uses data from Cote d’Ivoire to
show that the model is remarkably consistent with the mating and reproductive patterns
o fm e na n dw o m e nw i t h i nas o c i e t ye x h i b i t i n gl a r g ev a r i a t i o ni np o l y g y n o u sb e h a v i o r .
The analysis uses the CILSS data from Cote d’Ivoire in 1986. The data consists of a
sample of households and contains information on each member of the household. While
polygyny is formally outlawed in Cote d’Ivoire, the practice of polygyny is rampant, which
illustrates the futility of banning polygyny when the demand for polygyny is high. Forty-
one percent of all women between the ages of 18 and 40 are in a polygynous marriage,
and this ﬁgure ranges from twenty-four percent for Catholic women to sixty-two percent
for Muslim women. Table 1 presents sample statistics for male heads of households, and
conﬁrms that higher rates of polygyny are found within the Muslim community. However,
polygyny is still prevalent within the Christian community (27% of Catholic men) and
within the big city of Abidjan (15% of all men). Our empirical strategy will examine
whether economic variables can explain variation in individual marriage decisions within
religions, cities, and regions.
The main inference of the model is that polygyny depends not only on the level of
a man’s income, but also on the sources of his income. This result is examined in Table
2 where a probit is estimated for the probability that a man has more than one wife (i.e.
practices polygyny). The analysis controls for the geographic location of residence (dummy
variables for living in the big city of Abidjan or “Other Cities”, and three regional dummy
variables for living in the East Forest, West Forest, and Savannah), religion (dummies for
19See Footnote 1 for evidence.
25being either Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian, Animist, or Other Religion),
and age (dummy variables for each ten-year interval).
Table 2 conﬁrms the basic result of the model by showing that total income is posi-
tively associated with being polygynous, but higher levels of education and/or wage income
are associated with lower rates of polygyny. This result is true if education is entered by
itself, with wage income, or with the percentage of total income represented by wage in-
come. In addition, dummy variables for being self-employed in agriculture, self-employed
in business, and being a wage earner are included in the speciﬁcation. So, these ﬁndings
are not simply picking up the eﬀect of being a farmer versus a wage earner. Overall,
the results show that richer men have more wives, but controlling for total wealth, men
who earn their money through education and labor income have fewer wives. This result
conﬁrms the main prediction of our model: polygynous behavior is associated not only
with the level of income, but also the sources of income.
A second prediction of the model is that men who are wealthy because of their non-
labor income will tend to squander their money on multiple women of lower quality, while
educated men will tend to marry an educated woman and have educated children. The
ﬁrst column of Table 3 supports this prediction by showing that women in polygynous
marriages tend to have lower levels of education. The second column controls for the
education of the husband, and shows that educated men tend to marry educated women.
The second column also shows that polygynous men marry less educated women, even after
controlling for the man’s education. These results are all conditional on controlling for
the woman’s age, religion, and place of residence. Overall, Table 3 conﬁrms an important
prediction of the model: higher quality women will tend to be the single wife of a high
quality man, while low quality women will tend to be one of the multiple wives of a low
quality (but wealthy) man.
Another major implication of the model is that educated men prefer educated women
in order to produce more educated children. To examine this issue, Table 4 regresses the
education level of children on the characteristics of their parents. The results show that the
education levels of both the mother and father are signiﬁcant determinants of the child’s
education level - higher educated parents have higher educated children, even after control-
ling for household income. These ﬁndings are consistent with an important implication of
the model: the components of income, in addition to the level, are important determinants
of investing in child quality. These results are consistent with higher quality parents hav-
ing a comparative advantage in producing higher quality children. Furthermore, Table
264 shows that children in polygynous households are less educated, even after controlling
for parental education and household income. Therefore, educated men are using their
income to acquire fewer high quality women in order to produce higher quality children,
while wealthy men with lower human capital are using their wealth to acquire more lower
quality wives and children.
Table 5 closes out the analysis by showing that polygynous households have more chil-
dren after controlling for household income and parental education. Interestingly, parental
education negatively aﬀects the number of children, but the mother’s education level seems
to be more statistically signiﬁcant than the father’s education.20
Overall, the data from Cote d’Ivoire reveal many patterns which are consistent with
the implications of the model. Although polygyny is banned, the ban is clearly not binding.
The analysis reveals an underdeveloped country which is struggling to escape poverty
because polygyny allows men with high levels of non-labor income to squander their wealth
on multiple women of low quality and raise many low quality children. However, these
tendencies are reduced very signiﬁcantly if the man’s wealth is derived from education or
wage income rather than non-wage income. Therefore, all of these results conﬁrm the
main implication of the model: polygynous mating is related to the sources of income and
inequality, and not just the levels. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that norms
are not the entire explanation for the existence of polygyny or monogamy: variation in
polygynous behavior is found within various social groups, deﬁned by religion and location
of residence. This variation is explained with variation in the sources of income and
human capital, which conﬁrms the predictions of our model and the importance of purely
economic incentives in determining the prevalence of polygyny versus monogamy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses standard assumptions regarding preferences and the production of human
capital to explain why modern societies are less polygynous than less-developed societies.
The model explains why men in less-developed economies prefer quantity over quality in
wives and children, and derives the marriage market equilibrium which allows them to
aﬀord multiple wives. The explanation is rather intuitive. Rich men in less-developed
20For polygynous households, the analysis in Table 5 uses the average education of wives in the house-
hold because the regressions are performed at the household level, and therefore, the education level of
multiple wives in polygynous households had to be aggregated to a household measure. For monogamous
households, the average education level of all wives is simply the education level of the mother.
27economies are not eﬃcient at producing quality children because they tend not to have
high human capital themselves. Therefore, they have a low demand for quality children,
a n dc o n s e q u e n t l y ,al o wd e m a n df o rq u a l i t yw o m e nw h oc a nh e l pt h e mp r o d u c eq u a l i t y
children. As a result, women in less-developed societies are valued only for the quantity
of children they can produce, and not the quality. This makes all women very close
substitutes for one another, which keeps the price of all women low enough for richer men
to acquire multiple wives.
In more advanced economies, richer men tend to have high human capital, and
therefore, they are more eﬃcient at producing human capital in children. This creates a
high demand for quality in children and in women, because quality women are complements
in the production of high quality children. Thus, all women are not close substitutes in
the marriage market in advanced societies. Higher quality women are a scarce resource,
which drives up their price in the marriage market and makes polygyny is less aﬀordable
for wealthy men.
The results, therefore, can be summarized as follows: male income inequality gener-
ates polygyny, but female inequality reduces it. Moreover, the model shows how female
inequality is generated, as the value of women in the marriage market is directly determined
by the net value of her children’s human capital. So, naturally, when human capital has
a high value, women who can create high quality children more eﬃciently are increasingly
valued in comparison to low quality women. Thus, the value of human capital is directly
related to the value of women in the marriage market, which also helps to explain why and
how the “power of women” increases within the family and in society in economies with
higher values of human capital. In this manner, the model is consistent with the roughly
equal division of resources between husbands and wives in modern marriages.
In addition, the results of the model are consistent with the observed strong correla-
tion between development and monogamous practices, as well as the correlation between
higher assortative mating and higher returns to human capital. Furthermore, our analysis
using data from Cote d’Ivoire shows that after controlling for total income, men with higher
education levels and higher labor incomes marry fewer wives and have fewer children, both
of which tend to be more educated. That is, men who get rich because of their human
c a p i t a lt e n dt og of o rq u a l i t yr a t h e rt h a nq u a n t i t yi nb o t ht h e i rw i v e sa n dc h i l d r e n . T h e s e
results conﬁrm the main prediction of the model: the sources of income and inequality,
and not just the levels, determine the degree of polygyny in the marriage market.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the policy implications of our results. The most
28o b v i o u sp o l i c yi n s t r u m e n ti sab a no np o l y g y n y ,w h i c hw ea r g u ec o u l dh e l pl e a dt om o r e
growth and development if it is enforced. However, it will be diﬃcult to enforce if the
demand for polygynous behavior is strong, in particular because polygyny is typically
beneﬁcial for rich men who tend to wield disproportionate political and social power. If,
however, the demand for polygyny by rich men is naturally weak because of the high
value of human capital, then laws and norms against polygyny are more likely to evolve
because they are reinforced by economic incentives. A second policy instrument is a simple
subsidization of education. The subsidy will not only have a direct eﬀect of encouraging
increasing investments in education, but will also have an indirect eﬀect of encouraging
monogamy — since the higher net value of education will increase the payoﬀ of investing in
quality women and children. In turn, increasing monogamy can help create or reinforce a
monogamous norm, which then leads to more investments in child quality and more growth
and development to follow.
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317A P P E N D I X
This appendix presents additional notation necessary for the analysis of the marriage
market, derives the optimal marriage contracts and the general equilibrium, and provides
proofs for the lemmas and propositions.
7.1 Notation
A marriage contract oﬀer consists of a price, y, the skill level of the children, x, and a
bequest level for the children, b. Ap a i r(yij,b ij) denotes the oﬀer that a skilled man is
making to a woman with skill level i ∈ {s,u} to have children of skill level j ∈ {s,u},
where s and u denote skilled and unskilled respectively. For example, yus denotes the price
oﬀer of a skilled man to an unskilled woman proposing to raise skilled children. Similarly,
nij denotes the number of women that a skilled man marries, where i i st h et y p eo fw o m a n
and j is the skill level of their children.
As we show below, in equilibrium, unskilled men oﬀer marriage contracts only to
unskilled women to have unskilled children. Hence, we denote by µ and bl the price and
bequest, respectively, that an unskilled man oﬀers to an unskilled woman to raise unskilled
children, and by v the number of wives an unskilled man marries.
7.2 The properties of the optimal marriage contract
Every man oﬀers y,ε and b to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3). (In equilibrium,




+ εe + b)] + ln[n(x + b)]}.
There are three alternatives for investments in child skill; (i) ε =0 ,x=1 ;( ii) ε =1 ,
x = h, and e = e; or (iii) ε =1 ,x= h, and e =¯ e.
Case (i):If x =1and ε =0 , the ﬁrst order conditions are:
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Case (ii):If x = h, ε =1and e = e, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
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c = nss(yss + e + bss)=
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Case (iii) i st h es a m ea sc a s e(ii) except that e =¯ e , yielding:
yus =
h − ¯ e
2
(9)
c = nus(yus +¯ e + bus)=
I
2
7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a couple composed of two skilled parents, and let x and b denote the skill and
bequest levels, respectively, that are speciﬁed in their contract. Recall that their cost
of raising skilled children is e and the diﬀerence in income between skilled and unskilled
children is h − 1.L e t h − 1 <e . Hence, if x = h, then x + b can be increased without
aﬀecting c and n by setting x =1and increasing b by e. Therefore, if h − 1 <e ,x= h is
not optimal and cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that h − 1 >eand the contract speciﬁes x =1 . In this case, x + b can
be increased without aﬀecting c and n by setting x = h and reducing b by e. Hence, if
h − 1 >e ,x=1cannot be an equilibrium. Whenever h = e +1 , parents are indiﬀerent
between x =1and x = h, in which case we assume that they raise skilled children. Thus,
we have shown that if both parents are skilled, they raise skilled children if and only if
h ≥ h.
If only one parent is skilled, the cost of raising a skilled children is ¯ e. We can use the
same argument to show that if one parent is skilled and the other is not, they raise skilled
children if and only if h ≥ h. That completes the proof of Lemma 1.
337.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the contrary is true: there is at least one unskilled woman that raises skilled
children and a skilled woman that raises unskilled children.
It is easy to show that, in equilibrium, women within each type attain the same
utility level. Between types, there are two alternatives: (1) unskilled women have at least
the same utility as skilled women or, (2) skilled women have strictly greater utility. Let us
examine each alternative.
Alternative 1: Since it takes at least one skilled parent to raise skilled children, there
must be at least one skilled man that raises skilled children with an unskilled woman. If so,
a skilled man who oﬀered (yus,b us) c o u l dm a k ei n s t e a dt h es a m eo ﬀer, (yss,b ss)=( yus,b us)
to a skilled woman that had unskilled children and raise skilled children. He saves ¯ e − e
and she attains the utility level of the unskilled woman, which, in this alternative, is at
least as high as her own. Thus, he strictly gains and she does not lose, which could not
exist in equilibrium.
Alternative 2: Let z satisfy the condition that lnz+ln(1+bsu)=l nyus+ln(h+bus),
and recall that in this alternative lnysu +l n ( 1+bsu) > lnyus +l n ( h + bus). Hence,
lnz +l n ( 1+bsu)=l nyus +l n ( h + bus) < lnysu +l n ( 1+bsu)
and it follows that z<y su.
Consider a man that oﬀers the contract (ysu,b su).H ec o u l di m p r o v eo ni tb yo ﬀering
to an unskilled woman a contract of (z,buu) with buu = bsu. He is better oﬀ because he saves
ysu−z>0, and she receives the same utility since by the deﬁnition of z, lnz+ln(1+buu)=
lnz +l n ( 1+bsu)=l n yus +l n ( h + bus), implying that this alternative cannot exist in
equilibrium.
Thus, we have ruled out the two alternatives, which proves the lemma.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The cost of raising skilled children for unskilled men is at least ¯ e. Hence, if an unskilled
man raises skilled children then by Lemma 1 it must be that h ≥ h. However, by Lemma 1,
if h ≥ h, skilled men ﬁnd it optimal to raise skilled children with either skilled or unskilled
women, proving the lemma.
7.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Consider ﬁrst the case in which skilled and unskilled men raise unskilled children and
denote by v the number of wives that each unskilled man marries. Then by equation (7)
34the consumption price of women is 1/2 regardless of the man’s type. Since men value all
women identically, their children receive the same level of bequest. Hence, equations (4)
and (5) imply that niu = ν/r > ν, proving the lemma for this case.
Now, consider the case where at least some skilled men raise skilled children, and
assume by contradiction that unskilled men are polygynous, implying that some unskilled
men marry skilled women. There are two alternatives: (i) Skilled women that marry
unskilled men raise unskilled children or (ii) they raise skilled children.
In Alternative (i), it must be that skilled women are indiﬀerent between marrying
skilled men and raising skilled children and marrying unskilled men and raising unskilled
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h + bss ≤ 1+bsu.
On the other hand, since at least some skilled men raise skilled children it follows
that:
nss(h + bss) ≥ nsu(1 + bsu)=
v
r
(1 + bsu) >v (1 + bsu)
where the equality stems from (4) and (5). Hence, since h + bss ≤ 1+bsu, it follows that
nss >v ,and the lemma is proved for Alternative (i).
Consider Alternative (ii).B yL e m m a1i tm u s tbet h a th ≥ h. B e c a u s es o m eu n s k i l l e d
men marry more than one unskilled woman it follows from (5) and (7) that bl <λ / 2, where
bl denotes the bequest oﬀer of the unskilled man. Hence, a skilled man could oﬀer to one
unskilled woman with unskilled children yus =1 /2 and bus = bl +1− h. She is indiﬀerent
between the two options and he gains from it because he marries one woman and raises
educated children. This oﬀer is feasible for him as:
h + L
2






− ¯ e − bl − 1+h ≥ 0
where the inequality stems from the fact that h ≥ h =1+¯ e,a n dL/2 >λ / 2 >b l. Hence, it
cannot be that skilled men marry less than one woman each and that concludes the proof
of the lemma.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Since h<h , Lemma 1 implies that all men raise unskilled children. In that case, men
are indiﬀerent between skilled and unskilled women and we denote by niu the number of




Since, in equilibrium, all women marry,
θniu +( 1− θ)v =1
Substituting into (10) yields:
niu =
1
θ +( 1− θ)r
(11)
which proves parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition. Part (iii) follows immediately from
Lemma 1, thus completing the proof.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (ii) follows from Lemma 1. It remains to prove (i).
Suppose that there is polygyny and let h ≤ h<h. By Lemmas 1 and 4, some skilled
men marry skilled women and raise skilled children and the rest marry unskilled women
and raise unskilled children. Since skilled men must be indiﬀerent between the two options,
it follows that:
lnc +l n [ nss(h + bss)] = lnc +l n [ nuu(1 + buu)]
and since by (4), c is the same in both cases, it follows that:
nss(h + bss)=nuu(1 + buu) (12)
On the other hand, it follows from (4) and (5) that:
nss(yss + e + bss)=( h + L)/2 (13)
nuu(yuu + buu)=( h + L)/2 (14)
and,
ν(µ + bl)=( 1+λ)/2 (15)
Let p denote the proportion of skilled men that marry unskilled women. By Lemmas
1 and 4 and because all women marry:
θpnuu +( 1− θ)ν =1− θ (16)
and,
θ(1 − p)nss = θ (17)
36Finally, since unskilled women are indiﬀerent between skilled and unskilled men (in both
cases they raise unskilled children), it must be that:
µ(1 + bl)=yuu(1 + buu) (18)
Solving (4), (5), (7), (8), and (12) - (18) yields,
p =
(1 − θ)[1 − (h − e)r]
1+θ(h − e − 1)
(19)
Substituting (19) into (17) yields nss :
nss =
1+θ(h − e − 1)
(h − e)[θ +( 1− θ)r]
(20)
Equations (12)-(14), (19), and (20) imply,
nuu = nss(h − e)=
1+θ(h − e − 1)
θ +( 1− θ)r
(21)
Finally, we deﬁne the “degree of polygyny” as the average number of women that a rich
(skilled) man marries. Thus, from (19)-(21), the degree of polygyny is:
pnuu +( 1− p)nss =
(1 − θ)[1 − (h − e)r]
1+θ(h − e − 1)
1+θ(h − e − 1)
θ +( 1− θ)r
+1 (22)
=
1 − (1 − θ)(h − e − 1)r
θ +( 1− θ)r
which is declining with h, thus completing the proof of the proposition.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 3
It follows from (20) that nss is declining with h and reaches nss =1at h = h∗ ≡ 1
r + e, at
which point, by (19), p =0 . Note that (20) holds for h ≤ h ≤ h. Hence, there is monogamy
if h ≤ h∗ ≤ h which is the case if 1
r + e ≤ ¯ e +1 . Hence, monogamy exists if e − e ≥ 1−r
r .
Suppose that e−e < 1−r
r . In that case it follows from (20) that nss > 1 for all h ≤ h.
Hence, to complete the proof, it remains to rule out monogamy when h>h.
Let h>h, and assume by contradiction that there is monogamy. If follows from



































37Since each unskilled man marries one unskilled woman, and by (7) pays her 1/2, it follows
from (5) that they leave no bequest to their children. Thus, her utility is ln 1
2 +l n1 .
Hence, an educated man could oﬀer an unskilled woman the contract (yus =1 /2,b us =
1 − h), making her indiﬀerent between the two alternatives. By (4), this contract implies
that nus = h+L
2 (1
2 +1− h +¯ e)−1 and his utility, U2 under this contract, increases since:
U2 − U1 =
h + L
2(1




























w h e r et h ei n e q u a l i t yf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tf o rh ≥ h, 1
1
2−(h−1−¯ e) ≥ 2. Hence, the alter-
native contract strictly increases the man’s utility without reducing the woman’s utility
which cannot be true in equilibrium, completing the proof.
7.10 Proof of Proposition 4
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that there is polygyny if h>h. This result, along
with Lemma 4, prove (ii). Part (iii) follows directly from Lemma 1.
>From Lemma 1 and parts (ii) and (iii), all skilled men have skilled children, some
with skilled women, and the others with unskilled women. Since they must be indiﬀerent
between the two options, and by (4) and 5,
nss(h + bss)=nus(h + bus)
nss(yss + e + bss)=( h + L)/2
nus(yus +¯ e + bus)=( h + L)/2
ν(µ + bl)=( 1+λ)/2.
Since unskilled women are indiﬀerent between raising skilled children with skilled men and
raising unskilled children with unskilled men,
µ(1 + bl)=yus(h + bus).
Finally, since all unskilled women get married,
θpnus +( 1− θ)ν =1− θ.











(h − ¯ e)(1− p)
+
(1 − θ)r








where k =( h+L)−1. Since the derivative of the left hand side of (25) is positive with respect
to p and negative with respect to h, it follows that dp/dh is positive. That, together with
(23) and (24), prove part (i), completing the proof of the proposition.
7.11 Proof of Proposition 5
For h ≤ h, Proposition 5 follows immediately from (11) and (22). To prove the proposition
for h>h, note that the derivative of the left hand side of (25) is positive with respect to p
and to r. Hence, higher inequality (lower r) increases p. By (23) and (24), nss and nus are
positively correlated with p, therefore, it follows that the proposition holds also for h>h.
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Low Quality Women 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Male Heads of Households in Cote D’Ivoire, 1986 
 
 Mean  Std.  Deviation 
 
Polygyny Dummy Variable 
 
  
All Men  0.30  0.46 
Muslim Men  0.42  0.49 
Anamist Men  0.32  0.47 
Catholic Men  0.18  0.38 
Protestant Men  0.19  0.39 
Other Christian Men  0.23  0.42 
Other Religion Men  0.16  0.37 




Muslim 0.34  0.47 
Anamist 0.25  0.43 
Catholic 0.27  0.44 
Protestant 0.05  0.23 
Other Christian  0.04  0.20 
Other Religion  0.03  0.18 




City of Abidjan  0.21  0.41 
Other Cities  0.22  0.41 
East Forest Region  0.23  0.42 
West Forest Region  0.15  0.36 
Savannah Region  0.19  0.39 
    
Income and Education Variables 
 
  
Total Personal Income  1,388,546  1,591,037 
Personal Wage Income  446,907  1,193,002 
Years of Education  3.16  4.86 
Works for wages  0.24  0.43 
Self-Employed in Agriculture  0.51  0.50 
Self-Employed in Business  0.13  0.34 
    
Sample Size  1360   




 Table 2:  Probability of Being Polygynous, Male Heads of Households  
 
  



































































Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Religion Dummies 
 





being a Wage 
Earner 
 














Coefficient estimates are the marginal effects from the probit results.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The income and wage variables have been normalized by dividing by one million, and 
were created by subtracting the estimated annual income of non-heads of the household from the 
“created” variables for total household income and total household wage income.  Age dummies 
include the following categories: below 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and greater than 64.  The five 
geographic and six religion dummies are detailed in Table 1.  The sample includes all male heads of 
households between the ages of 21 and 70. 
 




Dependent Variable: Education Level of the Wife 
 
 











































Standard errors are in parentheses.  The explanatory variables have been defined in Tables 1 and 2. 







  Dependent Variable:  
Education Level of the child 
 
Dependent Variable = 1 if child 





























































all Wives in 
Household 
 
   0.046 
(0.013) 
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Geographic 
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Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample is restricted to children between the ages of 5 and 12.  
Age dummy variables are included for each age within this range.  The income variable has been 
normalized by dividing by one million. Table 5:  Explaining the Number of Children in Households 
 
 OLS  Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Number of Children in the Household 
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all Wives in 
Household 
 




Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic 
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Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample is restricted to households with a male head between 
the ages of 21 and 70. The income variable has been normalized by dividing by one million.  The 
analysis uses the average education of wives in the household because the regressions are performed at 
the household level, and therefore, the education level of multiple wives in polygynous households had 
to be aggregated to a household measure.   PREVIOUS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
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